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Introduction
The Shadow of Hierarchy and New Modes of
Governance
ADRIENNE HEuRITIER Political Science, European University
Institute
DIRK LEHMKUHL European Policy Analysis, University of Zurich
This special issue about sectoral governance in the shadow of hierarchy
focuses on two sets of questions. Firstly, do new modes of sectoral
governance in themselves contribute to the efficacy of policymaking or do
they require the shadow of hierarchy, i.e. legislative and executive
decisions, in order to deal effectively with the problems they are supposed
to solve? And, secondly, what are the institutional links between sectoral
governance and territorially bounded democratic governments? How do
different links contribute to the efficacy of policymaking and how do they
change over time? Is there a retreat of government from policymaking
and a corresponding increase of sectoral governance, or just the
opposite?
Distinguishing sectoral governance from territorially bounded demo-
cratic government avoids conflating them, as happens in the literature on
policy networks, policy subsystems and policy communities and hybridi-
sation (Sabel and Zeitlin ; Scott and Trubek ; Trubek and
Trubek ). While the two are in practice intertwined, we argue that
their analytical distinction is necessary in order to understand the nature
of their linkages and reciprocal influence.
Deﬁnitions
In ideal-type terms, sectoral governance is here defined as policy formula-
tion by private and/or public actors in delimited sectoral areas which
takes place outside the main political legislative avenue of decision-
making. By contrast, territorially bounded democratic government is based
exclusively on legislative decisionmaking and immediately derived execu-
tive decisions by public officials. The scope and focus of governmental
decisionmaking may be changed by government across all areas of a
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polity and is not limited to a particular subject or district. By contrast,
private and public actors developing sectoral governance measures are
limited to their particular sectors and sub-sectors, and cannot redistribute
resources from one policy area to another.
The term hierarchy is used to describe legislative decisions and executive
decisions that steer democratic governmental action at the national and
European level (Scharpf ). The shadow of hierarchy can involve
legislative threat or inducements. Legislators can threaten to enact
adverse legislation unless potentially affected actors alter their behaviour
to accommodate the legislators’ demands. Such threats have a probabi-
listic element (Halfteck ). Whether firms respond by complying or
not complying depends on how likely it is that legislators will implement
their threat and how they would do so.
Dimensions of democratic government and sectoral governance
We first focus on the level at which democratic government and sectoral
governance are linked. Sectoral governance may operate at a supra-
national level and be linked to supranational forms of government, or
supranational governmental decisions may cast a shadow of hierarchy
over national sectoral modes of governance. Another important dimen-
sion concerns the number of actors involved in democratic government and
sectoral governance. Are multiple governmental actors interacting with
one actor of sectoral governance? Or do multiple actors of sectoral
governance interact with one governmental actor? If there are multiple
actors, do they co-ordinate their activities, and what are the implications
for policy efficacy?
What is the quality of the interaction or typical instrumental relation
(Windhoff-He´ritier ) characterising the link between democratic
government and sectoral governance? An entire continuum of attributes
is conceivable, extending from facilitating, approving, lending authority,
providing positive and negative incentivisation, and prescribing pro-
cedural rules and the structure of participant actors. It may consist of a
strict or loose monitoring relationship or direct imposition plus sanctions
by government on sectoral actors in cases of non-compliance. For
example, government may facilitate sectoral governance in terms of
infrastructure, by publicly approving the results of sectoral governance
and lending public authority. Or government may sanction ineffective
sectoral governance by threatening to act itself or legislating in ways that
transform the existing form of regulation. Whether governmental actors
are willing and able to exert positive or negative sanctions is variable.
The point in time of government intervention in sectoral governance can
be located along a continuum: governmental action may trigger or
 Adrienne He´ritier & Dirk Lehmkuhl
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accompany sectoral governance; it may directly participate in sectoral
government (co-regulation) on a regular basis; or it may be announced as
a last resort if sectoral governance should fail.
Empirically, there are a variety of sectoral modes of governance
related to different forms of governmental action: self-regulation, defined
as policymaking by non-legislative public and private actors indepen-
dently from political actors’ intervention (e.g. voluntary agreements of
industry possibly with private third party certification); regulated self-
regulation, defined as policymaking by private actors in a regulatory
framework set by legislation (e.g. voluntary agreements acknowledged by
public authorities); or co-regulation, defined as joint policy- and rule-
making by public and private actors (see e.g. Knill and Lehmkuhl ).
Speciﬁcation of the research questions
This special issue addresses the question: is the shadow of hierarchy
needed to guarantee the efficacy of policymaking and policy performance
under sectoral governance? Which link between government and
governance – along the specified dimensions – ensures a high policy
performance. It has been argued that the new modes of sectoral
governance have been delegated to non-legislative and private actors
because the latter have more expertise and are more flexible and speedy
in adjusting to new and complex environmental challenges. Moreover, by
being cut off from the mainstream of legislative political decisionmaking,
sectoral governance is supposed to guarantee the credibility and stability
of public policymaking in the light of changing political preferences
of governments. To what extent does the performance of the different
types and forms of sectoral governance analysed here bear out this
expectation?
The conditions in which the threat of governmental intervention
increases or decreases policymaking efficacy of governance actors may be
explained by a multiplicity of hypotheses. The threat of legislation in
a policy area can induce private actors to engage in effective self-
regulation. It may also motivate private actors to make sustained efforts
at self-regulation in order to avoid legislation. Regular executive moni-
toring of sectoral self-regulation may prevent the externalisation of costs
of self-regulation to the rest of society; executive monitoring of sectoral
self-regulation supported by boards of stakeholders may reduce the
externalisation of costs of sectoral self-regulation even more (Cafaggi and
Muir Watt ); the imposition of standards plus sanctions will induce
more effective sectoral governance than mere public recognition. The
support given to these hypotheses is likely to vary between policy areas
and to change over time.
Shadow of Hierarchy 
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Two broad patterns of change are perceptible in the link between
government and governance over time. One pattern is that sectoral
governance may roll back the frontiers of government by shifting tasks to
non-legislative and private actors’ policymaking bodies. This may occur
at the vertical or horizontal level. National governmental tasks may give
way to supranational or national sectoral forms of governance. Such a
general tendency was, for instance, to be observed in European environ-
mental policy in some areas of clean air policy at end of the s. The
opposite pattern, sectoral governance preparing the way for government,
identifies a shift from previously purely sectoral modes of governance to
governmental action. In particular, European decisionmakers want to
make inroads on sectoral modes of governance in areas such as social
policy and labour market policy, for example, through the open method
of co-ordination. Given the pressure of high unemployment, member
state actors were willing to accept a new mode of governance, because it
does not imply a surrendering of formal national competences to the
European level (de Ruiter ). Between the two extreme patterns a
variety of gradual changes can be mapped along the dimensions of level,
actor structure, quality of interaction and time.
Theoretical background
We argue that answers to many of the questions raised above may
plausibly be derived as hypotheses from contract theory in general,
principal-agent theory as used in political science and transaction-cost
theory (Brousseau and Fares ). We do not build our argument on
normative economic principal-agent theory, which is based on the
assumption of perfect rationality and seeks to prevent hold-ups by the
agent by drawing up a complete contract with in-built incentives to
prevent shirking on the part of the agent (see Karagiannis ). Political
science principal-agent theory is based on the assumption of actors’
bounded rationality and, as a consequence, incomplete contracts be-
tween principal and agent. The development of governance may initially
be conceived as a contract between governmental actors and actors of
sectoral governance which, given bounded rationality, is incomplete and
does not include provisions for all possible contingencies and events of
the future. Given an incomplete contract and the opportunism of the
contracting partners, rules are drawn up between the contracting parties
that establish a governance arrangement (Brousseau and Fares ;
Koenig-Archibugi ) providing for the adjustment of the contract to
changing conditions, for resolving conflicts in the application of the
incomplete contract and for ensuring compliance with the contract.
 Adrienne He´ritier & Dirk Lehmkuhl
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A contract does not have to be formalised in writing, but can also be
an informal agreement. In particular, patterns of voluntary co-operation
and of admittance of private actions by public actors are intriguing
examples involving self-regulation, as in the case of paper and PVC
industries and collective agreements by social partners. They would not
be recognised within a narrow and formalistic concept of delegation.
Even when tolerating or incentivising private self-regulatory actions,
governmental actors maintain a different role in the overall governance
arrangement as the shadow of hierarchy continues to exist. The same
holds for informal modes of co-operation between governmental and
governance actors for instance, in networks of regulators or fora of
specialised agencies and private actors such as the Florence Energy
Forum or the Madrid Forum for Gas. In these cases, we may look in vain
for acts of formal delegation or efforts of designing with complete
contracts. Rather, networks and stakeholder forums engage in policy
formulation or implementation without clearly delegated authorisation.
It is important to note that governmental actors, most often the European
Commission, have stressed their intention to retain control as principal
over regulatory processes.
When drawing up a contract to produce policies, the partners have to
take into account pre-existing legislative or institutional rules. The link
between political institutional rules and the contract among actors of
government and governance and its particular attributes is a central
concern of this special issue. In the language of political science
principal-agent theory, the actors representing the collective institutional
rules are the principals, the governance actors the agents.
The emergence of sectoral governance may be a result of deliberate
delegation on the part of governmental actors, or a tacit or explicit
tolerance of governance actors’ policymaking on the part of govern-
ments. Governmental principals might be willing to delegate because of
lack of expertise, or lack of time and political attention, or in order to
secure policy credibility over time by cutting policymaking off from the
changing preferences of changing governments. Governmental actors
may also insist on regulating the self-regulation or even fully participate
in the activities of governance actors, i.e. joint decisionmaking with
public actors (co-regulation).
In delegating policymaking functions to governance actors, the gov-
ernmental principals may run two risks, the risk of adverse selection and
the risk of moral hazard, i.e. the risk of losing control over the agent by
the principal (agency loss). To minimise these risks, a contract specifies
important conditions regulating the definition of the link between
democratic government and sectoral governance. The principal-agent
literature spells out a variety of instruments the principal may apply in
Shadow of Hierarchy 
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order to reduce the two risks of non-compliance, such as the mechanisms
of police patrol (i.e. the constant policing of agency practice) and
firebell-ringing or deck-stacking (i.e. defining rules governing the agents’
activities), using multiple agent structure, budgeting, monitoring and
threatening new legislation (McCubbins, Noll and Weingast ; Moe
; Sabel and Zeitlin ).
Major objectives of this special issue are to specify the conditions under
which the link with hierarchy increases the efficacy of sectoral govern-
ance and to discuss the conditions under which the link changes.
Principal-agent theory offers a number of hypothetical answers to the
question of whether a looming shadow of hierarchy is conducive to better
policy performance:
+ The more control instruments the principal applies, the less agency
shirking there will be and the better the policy performance will be.
+ The higher the technological complexity of a policy area, the less the
principal will be able to control the agent.
+ If agents at the national level are well organised and communicate
with each other, their position vis-a`-vis the supranational principal
and the national principal will be stronger and, as a consequence,
agency shirking will be easier.
+ A supranational principal will be better able to control the agent at the
supranational level than is possible for multiple national principals at
the national level.
+ If there are multiple principals with different preferences and a single
agent, the agent can more readily alter the contract de facto or in
writing.
In the following, we will address major findings and points of
discussion highlighted in the contributions to this special issue. Christian
de Visscher, Olivier Maiscocq and Fre´de´ric Varone evaluate the Lam-
falussy reform in the securities market, undertaken in  to improve
the legislative process while ensuring a democratic and institutional
balance. They demonstrate that the process as implemented has been
successful so far, but that more evidence is needed of developments.
David Coen and Mark Thatcher explore the European networks of
regulators that have been created in key industries, describing a growth
in network governance and the introduction of double delegation within
a principal-agent framework in Europe. In a review of the European
energy market, Burkard Eberlein finds evidence that governance and
government play complementary roles in the policy process. Leonor
Moral Soriano assesses the link between governance and government in
the Spanish electricity and gas sectors, deducing that one should not
 Adrienne He´ritier & Dirk Lehmkuhl
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presuppose that old modes of governance are strongly governmental and
hierarchical: the opposite is the case in the Spanish electricity sector at
least, where it is new modes of governance that are linked to hierarchy.
In their examination of the paper and PVC industries, Adrienne He´ritier
and Sandra Eckert establish that industry’s willingness to engage in
self-regulation is prompted by the threat of governmental legislation;
implementation of such self-regulation requires at least a weak ‘ shadow
of hierarchy’, rather than merely monitoring by NGOs. Dirk Lehmkuhl
underscores the European Commission’s increasing use of new modes of
governance – such as legally non-binding instruments – in competition
policy and shows that judicial control is becoming more prominent than
judicial review. Finally, scrutinising the history of the European social
dialogue, Stijn Smismans discovers a strong dependence on the shadow
of hierarchy; he concludes, however, that rather than ‘ complementing
government’ the current social dialogue looks like not-too-effective
governance in the absence of government.
Findings and points of discussion
Features of the link between government and governance
In most of our cases, there is interaction between the national and the
supranational level. Both the European social dialogue and the cases of
industry self-regulation predominantly occur at the European level: col-
lective agreements or voluntary accords are agreed upon by public and
private European parties, cross-industry social partners or sector-specific
European industry associations. The national level plays a role because of
the federal structure of these associations, but does not constitute an
important factor in determining the decision-making outcomes.
Governance of securities markets principally involves the member
states but predominantly occurs at the European level. In contrast, the
historical analysis of Spanish electricity and gas market regulation is
presented as a domestic story involving the Spanish government and
public and private bodies. The supranational level comes into the picture
only when domestic actors seek to upload domestic policy to the
European level or when they are expected to comply with European
provisions. The multilevel dimension of the delegation process is evident
in the case of regulatory networks in energy, telecommunications and
competition policy. It facilitates co-operation, information exchange and
implementation of supranational provisions through multilevel networks.
Networks of European regulators frequently have an international
dimension allowing for co-operation beyond the European Union, for
example, the international competition network established by the
European Commission or the Madrid Forum for Gas.
Shadow of Hierarchy 
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A large variety of actors are present in the EU governance arrange-
ments, starting with the Commission as a public governmental actor in
the cases of competition policy or the regulation of securities markets. In
securities and in energy regulation the Commission is also involved as
legislative actor. The European Parliament has a solely legislative role,
and the European Court of Justice and the Court of First Instance act as
the judiciary body of the EU. In some cases, such as self-regulation by
industry, the governmental role can be fulfilled by a single institution
such as the Commission, while in securities regulation the Commission,
the European Parliament and the European Council all have formal
decision-making roles. Multiple-actor policies pose the question: should
we consider European networks of regulators involving twenty-seven
national regulators and the Commission as single, multiple or collective
agents?
The complexity is increased by the variety of policy instruments
available, ranging at the extremes from a hierarchical command-and-
control approach restricting activities of sectoral governors, to pure
self-regulation with little or no shadow of hierarchy. The latter is the
case with European environmental self-regulation by industry: the
Commission does not give official recognition to the voluntary standards
adopted by industry, which might be a positive incentive. Although
extreme command-and-control approaches are not found in the cases in
this special issue, we find the threat and enactment of legislation are
evident as explicit assertions of hierarchy. Examples are offered by the
regulation of energy markets in Spain and at the European level and
the environmental self-regulation by industry. Facilitation plays a role in
European networks of regulators and energy forums in which the
Commission acts as a co-ordinating secretariat and covers travel expen-
ditures; the endorsement of privately developed standards is a central
feature in the regulation of European accounting standards, in secur-
ities market regulations and in the European social dialogue; the
Lamfalussy process is an example of lending authority to a sector govern-
ance decision. It also shows that it makes a difference when governmental
actors prescribe decision-making rules. Thus, the European Parliament’s
insistence on the introduction of a sunset clause sets a time limit on the
Commission’s implementing powers under the Lamfalussy process.
The point in time at which governmental institutions intervene in
sectoral governance activities varies greatly. In the first place it may
prompt the development of a specific governance mode, as it was the case
in environmental self-regulation by industry. Or a governmental inter-
vention may transform informal sectoral co-operation into a formal
governance structure. The European networks of regulators are a case in
point: informal co-operation is gradually changing into a formal pattern
 Adrienne He´ritier & Dirk Lehmkuhl
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of sectoral governance. What we find more frequently are cases in which
governmental intervention undertakes continuing performance monitor-
ing of sectoral governance activities. The consequences of poor perform-
ance differ greatly. In the pre-Lamfalussy stage of comitology, i.e. the
European Union-style committee system which oversees the acts imple-
mented by the Commission, authority is completely withdrawn, whereas
in environmental self-regulation by industry and European energy
market polices the threat of legislation loomed large.
A delegation theoretical account of hierarchy and new modes of governance
To capture differences between types of links between government and
sectoral governance, the papers in this special issue apply a theory of
delegation drawn from the political science approach to principal-agent
theory (see e.g. Stone Sweet and Sandholtz ; Pollack , ;
Thatcher and Stone Sweet ; Rasmussen ; Franchino ). It
offers answers to the questions: why do principals delegate specific tasks
and responsibilities to agents and which mechanisms enable them to
control the agents’ activities after delegation?
Why delegation
Given high transaction costs, delegation to specialised organisations or
agents allows political principals to tackle two core problems of govern-
ing: to ensure both sufficient expertise of decisionmaking and a substan-
tial degree of stability and predictability of policymaking. In the
regulation of securities markets, authors stress that the most important
causes for delegation under the Lamfalussy process are the slowness of
previous financial market regulations and the lack of expertise of
governmental actors in member states and the EU. Extensive comitology
procedures were established, which also allow for the involvement of
market practitioners, end-users and buyers of securities to increase
promptness of action and expertise, without aiming at any particular
substantive regulatory goal (de Visscher, Maiscocq and Varone, in this
issue). Eberlein, too, identifies the need for expertise as the main motive
underlying delegation in the case of the Florence Energy Forum. Coen
and Thatcher’s comparative case study on European regulatory networks
in telecommunications and securities reveals the same pattern leading to
the delegation of competences. High-level groups of experts or ‘ commit-
tees of wise men’, after exposing a glaring lack of policy achievements in
these sectors, proposed the creation of Euro-regulators to increase
regulatory efficiency and co-ordination. Similarly, in the case of environ-
mental self-regulation by industry, the analysis of He´ritier and Eckert
clearly shows that without the expertise of industry the complicated
Shadow of Hierarchy 
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technological problems of plastic and paper recycling could not be
adequately dealt with by governmental actors. By contrast, Smismans
shows that, in the case of the European social dialogue, delegation to
expert fora does not always turn out to be a success story. In spite of the
superior expertise of the governance actors, e.g. trade unions and
employers’ associations, the efficacy of policymaking is seriously endan-
gered by the stalled decision-making processes between the conflicting
actors within the governance structures.
The introduction of the European social dialogue illustrates a second
motive for delegation: creating credible commitment. Smismans con-
cludes that the emergence of the bipartite dialogue as a European mode
of governance may be traced not only to the conviction that this model
of socioeconomic governance could overcome the stalemate in decision-
making on social issues at the European level (deriving from the
unwillingness of national governments to yield competences to the
European level), but also to actors’ belief in the inherent value of this
form of socioeconomic governance. Eberlein’s contribution makes a
similar argument about the lack of upward governmental delegation to
the EU level motivating horizontal delegation to sectoral governmental
actors. In his words, delegation is politically expedient ‘ as a strategy to
work around the lack of supranational governmental powers, by estab-
lishing network mechanisms that can co-ordinate member state policies
. . . These transnational coalitions are designed to further domestic
reforms without having to resort to the level of political decisionmaking by
governments and legislators’ (emphasis in original). Finally, it was an
explicit credible commitment to ensure the undistorted operation of the
internal market that motivated the inclusion of competition policy into
the Treaty of Rome. Responding to a proposal made by President
Sarkozy of France to drop the European Union’s fifty-year-old commit-
ment to undistorted competition, Michel Petite, director general of the
European Commission’s legal services, stated that, even though for the
Community competition is a means and not an end, the European
Commission, frequently in tandem with European courts, has taken
effective actions against any distortions of competition in the internal
market regardless whether these result from companies or member
states.
The design and exercise of control
In the regulation of financial markets, firstly, a rather complex picture
emerges of how principals seek to ensure that agents do what principals
expect them to do. Under the Lamfalussy system (de Visscher, Maiscocq
and Varone and Coen and Thatcher, both in this issue) it is the member
 Adrienne He´ritier & Dirk Lehmkuhl
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state governments, the Commission and the Parliament that constitute
the governmental principals, and the regulatory networks of national
financial regulators that constitute the governance agents. In a constel-
lation of double delegation or dual agency, which extends across levels,
the governmental principals – the member states, the Council of
Ministers and the European Parliament – delegate the task of implement-
ing financial market regulation to the Commission. The Commission is
conceptualised as a governmental principal, which delegates this task to
the Lamfalussy committees, i.e. the European Securities Committee
(ESC) and the Committee of European Securities Regulators (CESR).
The latter constitute the governance agents.
The regulation of the financial sector through the Lamfalussy process
has indeed fulfilled its general purpose of speeding up the adoption of the
Financial Services Action Plan. The frequent consultation of experts has
reduced the average time taken to negotiate and adopt the first
framework directives compared to the normal co-decision procedure.
The Commission’s control over CESR is limited, however. There are
possibilities of sanctioning CESR’s personnel, and the Commission does
have a monitoring role within it, but with limited rights only. It can
influence the budget of ESC. De Visscher, Maicocq and Varone
emphasise that the governance actors in the area of securities regulation,
in particular the actors in CESR, are supposed to be fully independent
actors, thus reflecting a fiduciary relationship between member states and
these new bodies more than a principal-agent relationship. In terms of
the instrumental relationship between government and governance, this
indicates a ‘ hands-off’ attitude on the part of government and a
deliberate abstention from substantive control. Having been very critical
with respect to the Lamfalussy scheme, the European Parliament insisted
on sunset legislation to give it the power to review periodically the
renewal of the Lamfalussy legislation, thus giving the principals (the
Council of Ministers and the European Parliament) limited control over
the agent (the Commission).
Similarly, Coen and Thatcher conclude that the existence of a variety
of agents – i.e. several regulatory networks in the regulation of financial
markets – allows for more control by principals over governance actors.
An important mechanism is control over budget and resources. The fact
that the different principals do not delegate important organisational
resources facilitates their control over agents. Secondly, Coen and
Thatcher elaborate complex delegation processes across levels. At the
national level, governments of the member states have increasingly
created new independent regulatory authorities. Notwithstanding some
variance, independent regulators have a significant degree of legal
and organisational autonomy from government departments and other
Shadow of Hierarchy 
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sectoral or cross-sectoral competences. Member states have delegated
substantial regulatory competences upwards to the EU level, with the
Commission playing an outstanding role in EU sectoral regulatory
regimes. European regulatory networks have merged previously enacted
delegation processes at the national and European level. Coen and
Thatcher call this process a ‘ double delegation’ of powers and functions
that takes place ‘ upwards’ from the national independent regulators and
‘downwards’ from the European Commission to regulatory networks.
Control over European regulatory networks is exercised not only by the
existence of the multiple fora but also by a limitation of their resources
and independent decision-making competence. In his study of the link
between government and governance in the energy sector, Eberlein
shows that it is in particular the European Commission that casts the
shadow of hierarchy. Moreover, sectoral governance has the merits of
mobilising regulatory expertise and capacity and of producing workable
regulatory guidelines that are essential to govern a complicated sector.
However, sectoral governance appears to be less successful in enacting
regulatory solutions in the face of distributive conflicts in a politicised
environment. When delegating activities to the Florence Energy Forum,
the Commission never abandoned the threat of legislative and execu-
tive action to induce governance actors to overcome deadlocks when
engaging in effective self-regulation.
The case study on European competition policy firstly shows the
Commission acting as the agent of the member state principals. Over
time, the agent developed a considerable degree of autonomy, though it
has not been challenged by member states that have sought to redefine
the contract with the Commission. In this struggle, as Lehmkuhl shows,
a third actor, the European Court of Justice and the Court of First
Instance, played a crucial role in strengthening the Commission. More-
over, the latter attempted to increase the effectiveness of its policies by
increasing its enforcement capacities through decentralising the compe-
tence to detect violations of European provisions by including private
actors (in principal-agent terms, the Commission increased the number
of possible firebell-ringers) and, additionally, by charging national
competition authorities and national courts with the enforcement of
violations. On the other hand, the Commission has established a practice
of applying new instruments: legally non-binding, soft modes of govern-
ance, such as guidelines, declarations, codes of conduct and so forth,
which are meant to circumvent the political principals. These endeavours
were supported by ECJ rulings. The agent also improved its enforcement
powers by re-delegating them to national competition authorities and
national courts. Lehmkuhl concludes that it was not the shadow of
hierarchy which prompted more policy efficacy, but rather the agent’s
 Adrienne He´ritier & Dirk Lehmkuhl
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strategic behaviour to fend off the attempts of the political principals to
trim its wings.
In environmental self-regulation by industry, the Commission is the
governmental principal and industrial associations are the governance
agents. Here, too, He´ritier and Eckert show that there are conflicting
principals: the Directorate General for the Environment and the Direc-
torate General for Enterprise disagree about the mode of governance
as such. While DG Enterprise considers self-regulation by industry
desirable, DG Environment would have preferred legislation to reach
desired objectives. Disagreement about means reduces the credibility of
the threat of legislation. Industry decided to engage in self-regulation in
response to the threat of legislation (for the plastic industry) and the
threat to make legislation more stringent (for the paper industry); the
political pressure of NGO campaigns is of importance in only the PVC
case. There is a lack of hierarchical control through strict governmental
monitoring, imposing sanctions or lending authority and formal support
to the new modes of governance. Since the shadow of hierarchy over
implementation is absent, self-regulation in the plastic industry lacks
policy efficacy. In the paper industry, governmental control is also absent,
but this is counterbalanced by strong efficacy-increasing market
incentives.
In the European social dialogue on labour relations, Smismans
conceptualises the Commission and to some extent the Council as the
governmental principal, and employers’ associations and trade unions as
the actors constituting the governance agent. Apart from providing
incentives for the European social partners to negotiate, the Commission
may use its power of initiative in case of a perceived mismatch between
its objectives and the output of the interaction between labour and
business. Moreover, both the Commission and the Council may refrain
from endorsing an agreement of the private parties rather than make it
legally binding. While both alternatives provide the principals with
control powers, their practical relevance has been limited, for non-
implementation of an agreement or its change would jeopardise the
future credibility of the social dialogue as a mode of governance.
Empirical complexity and theoretical challenges
The emergence of the regulatory state implies a shift from a model in
which government plays a strong role in the provision of public services
to a model in which government limits itself to being the enabler and
regulator of the provision of public services by private actors. This has
created forms of sectoral governance involving a variety of public and
private actors in policy formulation and policymaking outside the
Shadow of Hierarchy 
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legislative arena. Whereas concepts such as network governance, hybridi-
sation or experimentalism tend to lump together both public and private
sector actors, we analytically distinguish government and governance in
order to apply principal-agent delegation theory. However, empirical
complexity presents three theoretical challenges.
Firstly, the role of government as enabler or regulator of sectoral
governance involves the delegation of competences to specialised agents.
Theories of delegation predict efficiency gains or transaction-costs
savings through such specialisation. Such an account of the Lamfalussy
process would interpret CESR as an expert forum providing policy
proposals to the Commission. However, de Visscher, Maiscocq and
Varone have shown that the European Parliament’s prime motivation in
the negotiations was not so much a concern about efficiency as worries
about losing influence if matters had been handled through comitology.
The Parliament gave in to the pressure of Council and Commission only
after it successfully used the leverage of its competences under co-
decision procedures to install a sunset legislation clause. This agreement
was not about the efficiency of specialisation but reflected a particular
political environment in which powers are dispersed between institutions
at the European and at the national level.
Secondly, contributions to this issue challenge the assumption made by
some EU specialists (see Lyne, Nielson and Tierny ; Pollack )
that the principal or the agent are unitary actors. They point out that
each can be internally divided. For instance, in the case of securities
regulation, the Council (i.e. the member state governments) and the
European Parliament act as principals vis-a`-vis the Commission as agent.
There are also multiple agents or a complex agent structure. Eberlein, for
instance, identified conflicts among agents over distributive issues of
European energy policy. Smismans’s case of the European social
dialogue is an interesting example of the institutionalistion of opposed
interests of labour and business in one organised agency. American
theorists generalise that in ‘most democratic political systems, grants of
delegation are made by multiple principals’ and that ‘ few interesting
cases in the real world of politics involve only a single agent’ (Bendor,
Glazer and Hammond : f.; see also Epstein and O’Halloran ;
Moe ).
Multiple principal–multiple agent constellations matter for the way in
which control can be exercised and hierarchy or its shadow brought to
bear in interactions between government and governance. With respect
to efficacy, our cases confirmed the hypothesis that a conflict among
principals weakens their control capacity over agents. A case in point is
the split between different DGs in the Commission in environmental
self-regulation by industry (He´ritier and Eckert, in this issue). In energy
 Adrienne He´ritier & Dirk Lehmkuhl
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policy, Eberlein identifies a double shadow of hierarchy resulting from
the principals’ specific properties, i.e. the European Commission’s
competences in sectoral (energy) and cross-sectoral (competition policy)
areas. The existence (and the creation) of multiple agents as in the cases
of energy and securities tends to increase the control capacity of the
principal.
Thirdly, principal-agent analysis is made more complicated because
actors can be viewed as principals or agents, depending on the analytical
perspective on their role in the process of regulation. For instance, Coen
and Thatcher identify a contrasting or complementary delegation de-
pending on whether the focus is on the emergence of European networks
of regulators (agent), an upward delegation from the national indepen-
dent regulators (principals) to the European Commission (agent), or
alternatively on the downward delegation from the European Commis-
sion (principal) to European regulatory networks (agent). Another
example is offered by the Lamfalussy process in which the Council and
the Parliament are principals and the Commission is the agent but, in the
interaction with CESR, the Commission is the principal and CESR the
agent.
Delegation and further delegation occur in the complex policymaking
processes of the modern regulatory state. The ‘hydra factor’ (Adams
: ), i.e. the possibility that actors are not only principals but also
agents, makes both the descriptive task and the analytical one more
difficult but also more interesting. In particular, these considerations
provide some insights for our analytical interest in the change in the
relationship between government and governance over time. Lehmkuhl’s
analysis of the centralisation of cross-sectoral governance in European
competition policy, for instance, confirms the observation that govern-
ance in networks is different from governance with networks (Bo¨rzel
: ).While the former assumes the dispersion of power and
competences in horizontal patterns of interactions, the latter emphasises
the importance of institutional politics, of power asymmetries and of
a shadow of hierarchy. In contrast, Eberlein’s analysis of the energy
policy at the European level provides some evidence for sectoral
governance’s preparing the way for more government, not in the form of
a centralisation of regulatory powers at the EU level, but as more
formalised networks of national regulatory authorities. The chapters of
de Visscher, Maiscocq and Varone and Coen and Thatcher as well as
Eberlein indicate that the combination of governance and government
results in a new systemic logic that is different from addition or
substitution. The interest in addressing the combination of empirical
complexity and theoretical challenges drives the contributions to this
special issue.
Shadow of Hierarchy 
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NOTES
. Research for this special issue has been supported by the European Union under the th Framework
programme (Contract No CITI-CT--). For more information about the Integrated
Project ‘‘New Modes of Governance’’, co-ordinated by the European University Institute in
Florence, please visit the project website at www.eu-newgov.org. We wish to thank anonymous
reviewers for their constructive comments and Karen Howes for her skillful copyediting.
. We focus on policy formulation because a distinctive feature of governance is the participation of private
factors in policy formulation.
. Policy performance is defined as policy outputs, i.e. decisions to deal with the problem at hand, and
policy outcomes, i.e. first measures to implement these decisions, which may be, for example, funds
spent, personnel hired or infrastructure put into place. It does not include the long-term impact on
behavioural change.
. ‘EU Commitment to Competition Policy Is Unchanged’, Michel Petite, letter to the Financial Times
(Europe),  June , p. .
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